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A wireless mesh network (WMN) comprises of mesh access points (MAPs)/mesh
routers and mesh clients (MCs), where MAPs are normally static and they form
the backbone of WMNs. MCs are wireless devices and dynamic in nature, com-
municating among themselves over possibly multi-hop paths, with or without the
help of MAPs. Security has been a primary concern in order to provide protected
communication in WMNs due to the open peer-to-peer network topology, shared
wireless medium, stringent resource constraints and highly dynamic environment.
These challenges clearly make a case for building multi-layer security solution that
achieves both wide-range protection and desirable network performance.
In this thesis, we attempt to provide necessary security features to WMNs routing
operations in an efficient manner. To achieve this goal, first we will review the
literature about the WMNs in detail, like WMN’s architecture, applications, routing
protocols, security requirements. Then, we will propose two different secure routing
protocols for WMNs which provide security in terms of routing, data and users as
well.
The first protocol is a cross-layer secure protocol for routing, data exchange
and Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) problems (in case of LAN based upon
WMNs). Our protocol is a ticket-based ad hoc on demand distance vector (TAODV)
protocol, a secure routing protocol that is based on the design of the Ad Hoc on
demand distance vector (AODV) protocol. Due to the availability of a backbone,
we incorporate the Authentication Server (AS) for the issuance of tickets which are
further used for secure routing, transfer of public keys and MAC addresses in one
single step. By incorporating the public keys, source and destination can easily
generate their shared secret key based upon Fixed Diffie-Hellman key exchange
protocol for data encryption and decryption. Our protocol is secure against both
active as well as passive attacks.
The second proposed protocol is to “achieve user anonymity in WMNs”. This
v
protocol is also ticket-based protocol. The ticket is issued by Network Operator (NO)
which provides user anonymity, user authentication and data confidentiality/privacy
throughout the WMN. Our protocol is inspired by the blind Nyberg-Rueppel digital
signature scheme. In this protocol NO issues tickets to valid users only and these
users can then use these tickets to access Internet or to access services provided by
Internet Gateway (IGW). IGW can only verify these tickets whether tickets are valid
or not but can not check “Identity of ticket holder”. This way, user anonymity has
been achieved along with user authentication and data privacy throughout WMN.
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